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1 Introduction
The Romanian two-part ﬁlm ‘Tales from the Golden Age’ (2009) portrays several
legends from the ‘golden age’ of communism. One of these tales recounts an
inspection of a village in preparation of a visit of state ofﬁcials the next day. The
whole village is nervous about the preparations and receives detailed instructions
from two inspectors. In a comical sequence of events, the inspectors end up getting
drunk with the villagers, and ﬁnally both inspectors and villagers ﬁnd themselves
stuck in a merry-go-round for the night. It is said that they were still spinning when
the state ofﬁcials passed by in the morning.
While folk-tale should not be confused for reality, it is easy to draw a parallel
between this dark comedy and current debates about ‘quality’ in Romanian uni-
versities. Concerns about quality are clearly connected to expectations of state
ofﬁcials (both domestic and foreign), while it is hard to untangle the inspectors,
academics and other actors involved in the merry-go-round of evaluations. These
evaluations were initiated between 2005 and 2011, a period in which Romania
joined the European Union and played an important role in the Bologna Process.
The broad header of ‘evaluations’ comprise, inter alia, quality assurance reviews by
the quality assurance agency ARACIS, a classiﬁcation of universities and
departments by the Ministry of Education, Science, Youth and Sports, university
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evaluations organised by the European University Association,1 as well as various
other audits mandated by ofﬁcial legislation.
Many perceive the amount of regulation to be a problem (see other chapters in
this volume), but so far little has been done to correct the situation (Geven et al.
2014; Păunescu et al. 2011, 2012; Sursock 2014). This paper2 aims to present some
suggestions on how this merry-go-round can be stopped, hopefully to the beneﬁt of
higher education and scientiﬁc research in Romania. The guiding question of the
paper is “How can evaluations in Romanian universities become more meaning-
ful?” Answers will be provided by analysing a set of interviews of 310 university
leaders, faculty and students in ﬁve Romanian universities.
We present ﬁve recommendations to the government, the ministry of education,
science, youth and sports and the various agencies tasked with evaluation (primarily
UEFISCDI, ARACIS, CNCS, CNFIS, and CNATDCU3). We also present four
recommendations to the universities, and interested faculty, students and other
stakeholders. While the primary audience of the paper is Romanian, international
organisations or individual observers of debates on quality assurance in Romania
may also take an interest. The core of our message is that (1) evaluation procedures
should be simpliﬁed, (2) students and professors should receive more control over
the evaluations and (3) agencies and university leaders should use a more open
deﬁnition of what ‘quality’ means for different people.
2 Evaluation in Romanian Universities
For-proﬁt education was booming in Romania all through the 1990s and early
2000s. Many were afraid that standards were dropping, and thought that regulation
was necessary. In 2004, the government appointed a new minister, Mircea Miclea,
1The European University Association has published its own synthesis report on Romanian uni-
versities. Many of the recommendations overlap with the analysis presented here. See Sursock in
the references.
2The paper is an outcome of a research project carried out in 2012/13, comprising of ﬁeld visits to
ﬁve Romanian universities. During these visits, 186 in-depth interviews were conducted with the
management of the universities, members of quality assurance bodies, professors, administrators
and students. While the research project initially addressed quality assurance in Romanian uni-
versities, this paper extends the recommendations to other ﬁelds of higher education governance as
well. The research underlying the paper was conducted in the context of the project “Higher
Education Evidence Based Policy Making: a necessary premise for progress in Romania”, run by
the Executive Agency for Higher Education, Research, Development and Innovation Funding
(UEFISCDI) between 2012 and 2014.
3‘UEFISCDI’ is the Executive Agency for Higher Education, Research, Development and
Innovation Funding. ‘ARACIS’ is the Romanian Agency for Quality Assurance in Higher
Education, ‘CNCS’ is the National Research Council, CNFIS is the National Council for Higher
Education Funding, and ‘CNATDCU’ is the National Council for the Recognition of Degrees,
Diplomas and Certiﬁcates.
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with plans to improve the quality of higher education. His main obstacle to do so
was the Romanian parliament. Many parliamentarians had connections with low
quality universities, and some had much to lose from tougher quality controls.4
In May 2005, the new minister went to the Ministerial meeting of the Bologna
Process in Bergen, Norway. At the summit, ministers adopted the ‘European
Standards and Guidelines for Quality Assurance in the European Higher Education
Area. This came at a very convenient time for Minister Miclea, who now had an
argument to establish higher standards in Romania. Upon return from the minis-
terial conference, he agreed with the government to pass an emergency ordinance to
adopt these new standards in Romania. While the parliament reeled, they could do
little against an ‘emergency’ measure, and were practically unable to amend the
proposals from ‘Europe’.
The ordinance established a quality assurance agency, ARACIS, which was
mandated to evaluate all degree programmes and universities in the country. The
idea behind the new agency was that it would shut down low quality universities
and degree programmes, while helping to improve the better universities. While
these aims were underlined as important in several external evaluations of
ARACIS,5 many questions remained about whether this was being done effectively
(Păunescu et al. 2011, 2012). Policy-makers therefore started making new proposals
to improve the quality of teaching and research in Romanian universities.
Around late 2010, there was another chance to reform the system. In 2007,
Romania had joined the European Union, and subsequently Romania was elected to
host the secretariat of the Bologna Process. The European ministers were now
pushing for new initiatives to improve the quality of higher education, mostly under
the header of ‘transparency instruments’. The government had just appointed an
ambitious new minister for education, Daniel Funeriu, who promised to modernize
the Romanian education system along European lines. The new minister sought to
develop an integrated reform package, culminating in a new law on education,
passed in January 2011.
Rather than replacing the quality assurance system, minister Funeriu developed
an additional set of policy instruments to modernize the universities. Each of these
instruments had a new element of evaluation. Perhaps the most important of these
was an instrument to classify universities in three categories: (A) research univer-
sities, (B) research and teaching universities, and (C) teaching universities. Whereas
universities previously received comparable amounts of public funding, the clas-
siﬁcation exercise sought to differentiate funding streams to the three kinds of
4One good example is that the current prime minister of Romania has been convicted by the
University of Bucharest of plagiarizing his PhD degree, and has subsequently been forced to give
back his degree. This is far from unique for Romanian politicians, of which many have doctorates
that have not been scrutinized. If tougher controls would be imposed on plagiarism, some major
politicians would probably lose their degree.
5First by the European University Association (EUA), then by the European Students Union
(ESU), and then also by the European Association for Quality Assurance (ENQA), as well as the
European Register for Quality Assurance (EQAR).
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universities. Additionally, the new law also introduced a number of alternative
audits and evaluations, including a ranking of departments by scientiﬁc discipline,
and an evaluation of doctoral schools.
The following table breaks down the different policy instruments that have been
introduced over the years. Table 1 shows six categories of policies, broken down
into ten different policy instruments that evaluate (aspects of) universities. Some of
these instruments are not (yet?) implemented, since policy-makers could not
(yet) agree upon the method of implementation. For instance, the methodology of
the classiﬁcation was never fully published, leading to a lengthy court battle over
whether it was a valid tool to fund the universities.
Many commentators have criticized the emerging ‘evaluation culture’ in uni-
versities, including in Romania (for an overview of this literature, see Geven and
Maricuţ 2015). While critique is important, it begs the question what should be done
about this problem. We decided to analyse the suggestions made by people who
interact with these policy instruments on a daily basis, namely university leaders,
faculty and students. The next section will lay out how we went about our research.
Table 1 Different instruments of evaluation in Romanian universities
Category Evaluation instruments Introduced in:
Quality assurance Institutional evaluation and
accreditation
2006 Law on Education
Quality Assurance
Programme evaluation and accreditation 1993, changed in 2006 Law on
Education Quality Assurance




Institutional classiﬁcation 2011 Law on National
Education (Art. 193)
Programme ranking 2011 Law on National
Education (Art. 193)









Legal standards for promotion 2011 Law on National
Education (Art. 295)




Audits of various managerial practices
like ethics, ﬁnancing, promotions, etc.
2011 Law on National
Education (Art. 218–219)
Note Based on an analysis of policy documents and legal texts
Sources Law 87/2006 on the approval of the Government Emergency Ordinance No. 75/2005
regarding the education quality assurance, Law 01/2011 on National Education, Art 295–297 and
subsequently Ministerial Ordinance OMECTS no. 6560/2012 and draft amendments to OMECTS
no. 6560/16.07.2013
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3 Methodological Considerations
Researchers can use many methods to evaluate policies, such as impact analyses,
cost-beneﬁt studies, policy process studies or implementation studies; each of these
based on qualitative and/or quantitative methods (for an overview, see Moran et al.
2006). Since we are trying to answer a question of meaning in this paper, we have
opted for an implementation study, based on interviews and documentary analysis.
Indeed, we thought that the most straightforward way to answer questions about the
‘meaning’ of policies was to interview the people who deal with this policy on a
daily basis. These people can tell us how policy instruments relate to their pro-
fessional practice, and what the boundaries of the policies are. Thus, we used a
tradition of ‘interpretive policy research’ that treats discourse of people and policy
documents as sources of ‘data’ (cf. Schatz 2009; Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012).
There are two main implications of using ‘discourse’ as a source of information.
The ﬁrst implication is that conceptual boundaries that are clear in theory may not
be so clear in practice. For instance, a document such as the ‘European Standards
and Guidelines on Quality Assurance’ makes a distinction between ‘internal’ and
‘external’ quality assurance (Dill and Beerkens 2010). ‘Internal’ quality assurance
refers to the evaluations initiated by people inside the universities; ‘external’ quality
assurance, on the other hand, refers to evaluations undertaken by the government or
other actors ‘external’ to the university. For our interviewees, however, both
‘internal’ and ‘external’ evaluations are seen as imposed by ‘others’ (Geven et al.
2014), thus rendering this conceptualisation inadequate to understand the experi-
ences of our interviewees.
In order to avoid getting stuck in this conceptual swamp, we use one general
term, ‘evaluation’, to denote the various assessments that take place in the uni-
versities. These include accreditation, quality assurance (both internal and external),
research assessments, audits, and various other forms of assessing work in uni-
versities. In this sense, we follow the literature about the ‘audit culture’ in uni-
versities (Power 1997; Shore and Wright 1999). While this conceptual lumping
may be confusing for those working in different ﬁelds of evaluation, we think that
our approach stays close to how people inside universities think about all these
forms of evaluations. Indeed, we were cautious about imposing our theoretical
preconceptions onto our interviewees.
A second implication is that our results cannot be considered ‘objective’. All our
recommendations have been developed from a qualitative interaction between the
researchers and the interviewees. Interviewees may confuse certain policy instru-
ments with each other, or talk about seemingly unrelated issues. They may be
experts on the subject, or it may be the ﬁrst time that they are thinking about
evaluations. Perhaps this is the closest we can come to an overview of the policy
implementation, since these are the very people dealing with implementation.6
6Some scholars may have questions about whether our interpretations are the ‘right’ ones. In order
to increase the validity of our ﬁndings, we allow others to replicate our ﬁndings (see next note).
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We carried out ﬁeldwork in 5 Romanian universities, representing different insti-
tutional types, and different geographical regions of Romania. The universities were
selected because these are considered to be good performing universities, who take
the evaluations seriously. In addition, we made sure to include four different regions
(South West, Centre, North East, South) and to include at least one private uni-
versity (Romanian American University). Table 2 gives a broad overview over
these universities.
Field-visits took place between December 2012 and June 2013, gathering the
views of 310 interviewees in 186 conversations (some interviews had multiple
participants). Interview participants were selected according to their professional
roles as decision-makers (i.e. rectors, vice-rectors, deans), faculty (professors),
administrators (i.e. secretaries), students, and QA-personnel (see Fig. 1 for the
distribution of interviewees). Interviews were carried out in the English or
Romanian language, following the preference of the interviewee. Notes were taken
in English and analysed using qualitative data analysis software. We developed a
coding scheme to identify main themes and problems, as well as possible
suggestions.7
In order to better understand what kind of policies we are talking about, we also
carried out an analysis of policy documents (primarily legal texts, policy papers,
quality assurance and evaluation guidelines). These were coded along similar lines
as the interview notes, allowing us to map the concerns of interviewees onto the
speciﬁc policies and procedures. We will present the results of this analysis in the
following sections.
Table 2 An overview over the universities in which we carried out ﬁeldwork










































Note Based on correspondence with administrators at the universities
7The interview transcripts and coding scheme are available upon written request to the authors.
Interviewee names are anonymised here, but can be fully traced if more information is required.
Each interviewee signed a consent form detailing this procedure.
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4 The Policy Problem
The interviewees recognize that there are good reasons why policy-makers have
imposed evaluations on Romanian universities. To name just a few prominent
issues: there are many universities who provide questionable education to the
students; teaching methods are usually out-dated; Romanian scientists publish few
articles in international journals; plagiarism is still not battled effectively, and so on.
While many interviewees recognize these problems, they question whether ‘eval-
uations’ are the right tool to address these problems.
Indeed, the interviewees consistently pointed out that evaluations fail to achieve
substantial reflection on higher education and scientiﬁc research (see Geven et al.
2014 for an analysis why this may be so). Three main problems were most dom-
inant: Evaluations are perceived (1) as bureaucracy that is often changed; (2) as
failing to create ownership; and (3) to be based on inconsistent evaluation criteria
that lead to gaming and compliance behaviour.
Table 3 gives a summary of the problem in a so-called ‘policy-tree’ that breaks
down the general problem into speciﬁc problems. Below, we will outline each of
the abovementioned problems in more detail.
Fig. 1 Interviewees’ role, broken down by university
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4.1 Evaluations Are Perceived as Too Bureaucratic
The ﬁrst problem with the national legislation is that it creates a bureaucratic
workload. Evaluations require documents, meetings, specialised staff, and working
structures that are seen to distract from academic work. This bureaucracy dominates
current evaluation practices; professionals see such practices as being disconnected
from their daily activities of teaching and research. This results in a sort of resig-
nation and task avoidance, which is seen as a major reason why evaluations cannot
be internalised (see also Păunescu et al. 2012).
This bureaucracy costs both time and money. Many of our interviewees, par-
ticularly those we see as decision-makers (rectors, vice-rectors, deans, vice-deans,
senate members) are faced with an enormous amount of papers each day. In the
words of some of them:
[We need] to stop working twice for the same thing. Why do I need to have a faculty report
and a QA report? Are they not the same thing? Why do we need two different reports and
formats? (Decision-Maker, Professor, Male, 50503).
Time management needs to become better. We are wasting a lot of time on useless
things (Decision-Maker, Lecturer, Male, 20705).
The QA process is characterized by huge quantities of bureaucratic requirements. We
are lucky that the Vice-Dean for Quality Management takes care of these documents
(Decision-Maker, Professor, Male, 50604).
Table 3 An overview of the problem regarding evaluation in Romanian universities in a
policy-tree, breaking down the general problem into more speciﬁc problems
General
problem
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In terms of ﬁnancial costs, we estimated for a large university that the costs for
undergoing quality assurance evaluations amount to around RON 1,160,900
(approx. €258,000) per year.8 This is a conservative estimate, since it only includes
direct costs of the external agencies and the costs of maintaining the quality
assurance unit in the university. It does not include the costs of the involvement of
faculty, university administrators, meeting rooms, European projects, evaluations
by foreign experts, research evaluations or any other evaluations undertaken by the
university. While some may argue that these are legitimate costs for improving the
quality of education and scientiﬁc research, we have our doubts that these costs can
be justiﬁed as such, since these reports are often unrelated to improvements.
To give another example of the bureaucracy, we present an overview of the
minimal activities by each university that we have found in Table 4. In the Table,
we ﬁnd the various structures inside each individual university, faculty and
department that we visited. The law prescribes universities to establish each of these
structures and activities, and we indeed could ﬁnd people involved in each of these
structures, as well as trails of documents and reports elaborated by each of them.
One of the main reasons why many of these evaluations are seen as meaningless
bureaucracy is that they are too often changed. One interviewee described the
situation as such:
Regulations are constantly changing and it is hard to follow up on them. Some of the
regulations are not coherent. We are constantly on stand-by. This creates confusion and we
cannot plan for the future. (Decision-Maker, Professor, Female, NS0302).
Since many of the governmental decrees mention some form of evaluation, the
word ‘regulation’ has become a synonym for ‘evaluation’. Consider a few major
legislative changes. The law on quality assurance has remained more or less in
place since 2005. The 2011 law on education, the classiﬁcation exercise and
associated legislation related to the evaluation of research centres added several
new layers of evaluation (see Table 1). In turn, the current government amended
these regulations several times. Because these regulations are changing so often,
universities cannot develop a consistent strategy for evaluation (see also problem 3
below). This creates confusion (since it is difﬁcult to keep up-to-date with the latest
legislative modiﬁcations) and prevents them from engaging in long-term planning.
Each of these changes has led to a build-up of frustrations about evaluations pro-
cedures and their supposed remedies among many academics.
Another reason why these procedures are perceived as bureaucratic is that they
overshadow more informal practices to improve. Yet, discussions at the coffee
machine or a simple personal exchange between colleagues are often the most
efﬁcient ways to solve a problem. One of our interviewees said that:
8This is based on a calculation of costs of all the programme evaluations and the institutional
evaluation (ofﬁcial costs ARACIS), as well as information provided to us by the university. While
the university faced a discount through a European Union funded project on quality assurance
(ACADEMIS project), these are included in the total price, since they provide a cost to the public.
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The contact with people is most important. Collegial visits could help, but please do not try
to quantify quality. (Associate Professor, Female, 20602).
When it comes to students, it may be much easier to hear their problems through
informal channels. As one student told us:
Face-to-face conversations are better if something needs to be improved. Professors
shouldn’t give up on this feature. (Student, Female, 30702).
Taken as a whole, we can perhaps say that these policy instruments try to
achieve too many things at the same time: applying minimum standards for cur-
ricula, matching curricula to labour market needs, introducing pedagogic innova-
tions, improving the management of the universities and faculties, and lifting
Romania’s scientiﬁc production up to Western European standards. And if this is
not enough, they also intend to rid the universities of plagiarism and corruption.
The combined effect is that these policy instruments achieve very few speciﬁc
intended results; instead they crowd out informal initiatives to improve quality as
we aim to show in the next section.
4.2 Academics and Students Do Not Feel Ownership Over
Evaluations
A problem closely related to the frustration over the evaluation procedures is that
actors in the university feel little ownership over the criteria on which evaluations are
based and how this is being done. The faculty in the universities express it as such:
Table 4 The various evaluation structures and practices in all Romanian universities in which
ﬁeldwork was obtained. All these structures are prescribed by national legislation and policy
documents
University level Faculty and department level
Administrative structures, such as vice-rector
positions for academic quality and scientiﬁc
research, a department on teaching quality, a
department on scientiﬁc research, a
commission on quality and evaluation (CEAC)
and various senate commissions on quality
Administrative structures, such as a faculty
commission on quality and evaluation,
speciﬁc positions for vice-deans
Internal reviews, such as institutional reviews,
internal programme reviews, research reviews
and ﬁnancial audits
Evaluations of faculty, such as peer reviews,
self-evaluations and managerial evaluations.
Documents, such as a quality policy, quality
reports and an internal research strategy
Documents, such as a faculty-level quality
policy, quality reports, publication lists, etc.
Surveys, such as alumni questionnaires or
student questionnaires
Formal deliberation, such as discussions on
curricula and research
Informal deliberation, such as discussions at
the coffee machine or in class
Note Based on ﬁeldwork in the ﬁve universities
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The QA system was only created in response to the law and ARACIS requirements - there
is no point to hide this fact (Decision-Maker, Associate Professor, Male, 11201).
We are forced by all these different institutions, ARACIS, EUA, to do such evaluations
(Decision-Maker, Professor, Male, 10202).
The invocation of authorities like the ‘law’ and the ‘external agencies’ under-
lines that evaluation procedures do not exist because faculty and students think they
are ‘ideal’. Evaluations are viewed as something imposed from the outside, through
procedures meant to artiﬁcially create a ‘quality culture’.
While students participating in administrative structures typically felt slightly
more involved than academic staff, not all students feel that they are being listened
to, even if they are being heard. Indeed, in practice, many barriers exist that hinder
students’ active participation in these evaluations.
There is not a lot of freedom of speech. The problem is mostly in our mind, but also we are
not asked to speak our mind, not allowed to say what we really think (Student,
Postgraduate, Female, 10603).
A big problem is the laziness of the students. About 50 % of the students do not even
read their e-mails. Students are also not very involved in the university (Student,
Postgraduate, Male, 10802).
While it is hard to give any ‘objective’ measure of this lack of ownership, the
end-result does present some unintended consequences. Since the evaluation pro-
cess is not seen as legitimate, people display strategic behaviour towards the
evaluations. This problem is often referred to in the literature as ‘gaming’ the
system (cf. Hood 2006). This seems to range from trying to avoid consequences
from evaluations (especially with regard to the ranking exercise) to outright pla-
giarism in order to meet research requirements (or indeed improve one’s status).
The irony is that the evaluations may reinforce the very gaming behaviour they are
meant to address. The following quote from a faculty member is instructive:
[In order to fulﬁl the publication criteria,] “I take information from students’ diploma
projects. I give them some research to do, and maybe I get some papers from the research. It
is maybe not so good, but both the student and I gain from this (Associate Professor, Male
20503).”
Indeed, another unintended consequence is visible in scientiﬁc research. Many
interviewees mention that the current assessment framework for scientiﬁc research
is heavily biased towards the sciences for which international journals exist (that
have an interest for Romanian science). Although most interviewees think that it is
pointless to reward research in the humanities or legal research in the same way as
theoretical physics, this is precisely what is being done. The assessment framework
does not acknowledge that publication practices differ widely between disciplines in
terms of how often one can publish, whether one has access to international journals
and with whom one collaborates. The unintended consequence is that only a few
scientiﬁc ﬁelds are seen as ‘serious’ sciences that are worthy of funding and public
attention.
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4.3 Evaluations Are Perceived to Be Based on Inconsistent
Criteria
This gaming behaviour is reinforced by the fact that the evaluations are based on
different standards and performance indicators. Table 5 is the same as Table 1, now
displaying the different indicators used in each instrument. In the programme
evaluation and accreditation organised by ARACIS introduced in 2006/7, there are
43 different performance indicators. In the programme ranking introduced in 2011,
on the other hand, there are no less than 80 variables on which the programmes are
evaluated. If we consider these standards as additive, then there are close to 300
formal standards to which the universities have to comply.9 These indicators do not
so much complement each other, but are quite different indeed. Whereas the quality
assurance and accreditation scheme focuses on education and training, as well as
the internal quality assurance procedures of the university, the classiﬁcation
emphasises research productivity (scientometrics) and ‘external relations’. This
makes it quite hard for academics to ﬁgure out what the standards really are.
If we take a more detailed look, we can see that the instruments are based on
different underlying ideas of ‘quality’. The quality assurance scheme is based
on minimum standards for all universities, whereas the classiﬁcation is based on
nominal categories for universities. In other words, the quality assurance and
accreditation is based on the idea that there are common (minimum) features to all
universities, whereas the classiﬁcation is based on the idea that there are different
kinds of universities. The ranking, on the other hand, is based on the idea that
universities are inherently ‘better’ or ‘worse’ than each other. Indeed, the ranking
instrument places these universities and programmes on an ordinal scale.
What is important about these inconsistent criteria is that they lead to a confusing
picture for the academics, let alone for students and the general public. A university
can receive, in principle, high trust in the accreditation process, but categorised as a
‘C’ university (i.e. teaching only) in the classiﬁcation, and its departments may be
ranked in the middle of the distribution. To achieve a higher ranking, it may have to
shift resources away from education to scientiﬁc production, which may in turn
lower its status in the accreditation system. In other words, these different instru-
ments send confusing messages to the universities about what is required from
them, and do not help the wider Romanian society to understand what is going on
in the ﬁeld of higher education and research.
At the level of the universities, there is much complaining, but little reflection
about these standards. While a few universities have deﬁned their own standards for
9The total that we count is 294: Added together are the 43 standards from quality assurance, 65
performance indicators from doctoral schools evaluation, 91 variables from the institutional
evaluation, 80 variables for the departmental ranking, 4 central questions from the university
evaluation, 11 indicators from the research evaluation. While this may be nitpicking, this number
is likely to underestimate the actual amount of standards universities have to comply to, since
evaluation panels often introduce new standards (i.e. subject speciﬁc standards).
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evaluation, this has not yet trickled down to the faculties and departments. We have
not found a single faculty where there exists a systematic plan to improve teaching
and learning practices or to experiment with pedagogic innovations.10 Similarly, we
Table 5 The different criteria used in each policy instrument (see Table 1 for more information
about each instrument)
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Note Based on an analysis of policy documents and legal texts
aARACIS. 2006. Methodology
bIbid, ARACIS. 2006. Speciﬁc standards of specialist committees. Available at http://www.aracis.
ro/uploads/media/Standarde_speciﬁce_ale_comisiilor_de_specialitate.zip
cThe methodology for the evaluation of doctoral schools exists only in draft form and has, until
now, only been piloted. The draft is available at http://administraresite.edu.ro/index.php/articles/
16691
dMinisterial Ordinance OMECTS no. 4174/13.05.2011
eibid
fEUA. 2012. Institutional Evaluation Programme: Guidelines for Institutions. Project “Ready to
innovate, ready to better address the local needs. Quality and diversity of Romanian Universities”.
Brussels: EUA
gUEFISCDI. 2010. Romanian Research Assessment Exercise (RRAE) General Assessment
Methodology. Bucharest: UEFISCDI
hLaw 01/2011 on National Education, Art 295–297 and subsequently Ministerial
Ordinance OMECTS no. 6560/2012 and draft amendments to OMECTS no. 6560/16.07.2013
iMinisterial Order. OMECTS 5691/27.10.2011 on the CNATDCU Habilitation Thesis
10We have found one department that was engaged in pedagogical innovation. Perhaps unsur-
prisingly, this was a department of pedagogy.
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have found very few instances of faculty-level attempts to improve scientiﬁc
research production. Indeed, there are many individual initiatives to achieve this,
but this is not done very systematically. Can these instruments lead to a reflection
on education and scientiﬁc research?
Perhaps it is important to reiterate that evaluations do not replace action.
Evaluations are diagnostic instruments; they are not the medicine to cure the
patient. In fact, we (and our interviewees) found it quite hard to attribute follow-up
activities to each of the evaluations carried out. We cannot put it better than one of
our interviewees:
I do not believe that even 100 laws will increase quality in the system. Most people respond
with maximum attention to forms, but the best way to learn on how to have a quality
education system is by learning from [other] teachers. That is how we learned before
(Decision-Maker, Professor, Male, RS0903).
In line with this statement, we think that the government and the universities
should strengthen the common-sense discussions about quality of education and
scientiﬁc research. We will present our recommendations to achieve this in the next
sections.
5 Recommendations for National Policy-Makers
To address the previously outlined general problem and its causes, many inter-
viewees plea for systematic reflection on key dimensions of education and research.
Table 6 gives an overview over the recommendations that we drew from the
interviews. In this section, we will elaborate on the recommendations at national
level, recognising that these will address the ‘external’ evaluations.
Objective 1: Simplify the procedures
Recommendation 1.1: Reduce the number of evaluation instruments and reports.
At the moment, several evaluations are being undertaken across universities in
Romania, that absorb too much time and money. Therefore, we suggest that
policy-makers integrate the existing evaluation instruments (see Tables 1 and 5)
into a single, comprehensive evaluation scheme that will satisfy the need for quality
assurance, quality improvements, and comparative quality analysis across institu-
tions. A single evaluation system will reduce the amount of administrative and
paperwork conducted at the moment by universities, and will make the standards
and their assessments more transparent for professionals. Failing to do so—or
worse, increasing the number of evaluations—is likely to further increase the
bureaucracy that universities deal with on a daily basis.
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Recommendation 1.2: Evaluate the evaluation procedures as a whole every ﬁve
years.
Evaluation procedures can never be perfect instruments to assess all aspects of the
quality of higher education. However, that doesn’t imply that they cannot be
improved. As new priorities for higher education emerge, countries should invent
new ways to evaluate universities. Consequently, we suggest the holistic assess-
ment of the evaluation practice(s) on national level every 5 years. Current external
evaluations clearly do not do so: they only review the quality assurance agency
ARACIS, but hardly ever address other forms of evaluation. This time interval
would give enough stability for the evaluation practices to be understood and
effectively carried out by institutions, but also provide an opportunity for national
level stakeholders to make small improvement where needed. Moreover, involving
university leaders, faculty and students in this process is crucial, since they are the
ones who deal with quality assurance regularly.
Table 6 An overview over the recommendation to address the policy problem
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Recommendation 1.3: Take misconduct out of the evaluations.
Misconduct (i.e. bribery, plagiarism, etc.) is recognised as a major problem, but
interviewees question whether evaluation instruments are the right tools to address
it. The problem is one of effectiveness: evaluation instruments do not respond
quickly or directly with individual cases of misconduct. Instruments that would be
more effective in dealing with misconduct should aim at distributing power within
the university and increasing transparency (after all, academic misconduct is abuse
of power). Moreover, some innovative tools are now available such as
anti-plagiarism software to review previously published and new scientiﬁc publi-
cations. Cases of bribery in relation to exams can be dealt with more effectively by
providing external reviews of students’ (dissertation) work or using standardized
tests carried out by external examiners.
Objective 2: Allow professors and students to influence the standards for evaluation
Recommendation 2.1: Focus on organising the evaluations without pre-deﬁning all
the standards.
The quality assurance agency ARACIS sets two types of standards for universities:
a list of minimum standards, and a set of ‘reference standards’. Other evaluation
practices prescribe similar—or even higher—levels of performance based on which
institutions and people are assessed. While these standards are often meant as
‘minimum quality’, they in fact crowd initiatives of universities, departments and
faculty to deﬁne quality according to their own terms and standards. It would be
more effective if professors and students set many of the standards on which they
want to be assessed themselves; it would encourage organisational actors to con-
ceptualize quality and engage in a search for relevant benchmarks. This is also the
direction taken in the revised European Standards and Guidelines that are to be
adopted in the Bologna Process. Failing to allow professors and students to deﬁne
more of the standards themselves will continue to create perverse incentives where
individuals trick the system, as is currently the case.
Objective 3: Apply a more consistent and open concept of ‘quality’
Recommendation 3.1: Reduce the number of criteria on which evaluations are to be
carried out.
We have shown above that there are 10 evaluation instruments, with a combined
load of close to 300 standards on which the universities have to comply. Every
evaluation is based on an implicit (or explicit) idea of what quality is. This pre-
conception is reflected in the criteria or standards set by the external agency that is
in charge of carrying out the activity. The criteria vary across the evaluation pro-
cedures applied in Romania, which results in an unwanted level of confusion
among universities and individuals. The more criteria are predeﬁned, the more
limited the possibility of universities to supplement the assessment of quality with
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additional aspects, tailored to their own needs Hence, the reduction of criteria on
which evaluations are carried out can reduce the existing formal inconsistencies,
while simultaneously broadening up the discussion on the meaning of quality.
6 Recommendations for the Universities
For many in the universities, changes at the national level are uncertain and it may
take much time before they are realised. In light of the uncertainty of parliamentary
processes, it is important to enact changes in the universities as well. These changes
can be enacted even if politicians are slow in responding to the problems identiﬁed
here. The following changes can improve the ‘internal’ evaluations.
Objective 1: Simplify the procedures
Recommendation 1.4: Foster informal evaluation practices as well as formal
practices.
Current evaluation practices put too much weight on formal assessment methods,
such as questionnaires and reports. However, often quality is debated in a less
formal environment, without explicit planning or measurement behind it. Such
informal practices have been present in universities for a long time, and in some
cases continue to be the most important evaluation method. Therefore, we suggest,
that informal assessments should be also accounted for, by encouraging individuals
to constantly assess the quality of their own work and that of their institution, and
providing formal ways to share this knowledge between professors and students.
Objective 2: Allow professors and students to influence the standards
Recommendation 2.2: Enable a more flexible approach to evaluations within
departments.
It is extremely difﬁcult to assess national standards across departments and scien-
tiﬁc disciplines. Many ﬁelds of knowledge are so speciﬁc that the meaning of the
criteria gets distorted (a problem of scientiﬁc validity). We therefore recommend a
more flexible approach at the institutional level. Particularities of the teaching and
research traditions of each department should be allowed to influence and change
the outcome of the assessment.
Objective 3: Apply a more consistent and open concept of ‘quality’
Recommendation 3.2: Organise structured discussions about the meaning of
quality in faculties and departments
Individuals tend to deﬁne the quality of academic practice differently. Nevertheless,
without structured discussions on this topic among academics, the existing practices
will likely remain superﬁcial or technical. These discussions can be used to adopt
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professional standards for faculty and students. Promoting organized deliberation
on the quality of work at the university, the quality of teaching and research, the
quality of administration and management, and so forth, is essential for developing
a shared understanding on what quality is in the context of a particular institution.
These events should be initiated on a regular basis by the top-management of the
institution, and be open to professors, students, employers, and representatives of
the wider community.
Recommendation 3.3: Develop professional networks between people working on
evaluations.
Professors and administrative staff carry out evaluation exercises in most of the
universities. Over time, these individuals build up extensive experience in carrying
out evaluations, and some develop manuals, reflexive literature, or other new ideas.
Organizing professional networks between people working on evaluations will help
the institution to make good ideas travel from one organizational unit to the other,
or to help the involved individuals to overcome some of the emerging challenges
more easily. Certainly, the more isolated the involved stakeholders remain from
each other, the harder it becomes to organize evaluations across the university.
7 Concluding Remarks
In the last few years, Romanian policymakers have done a lot to improve the
universities in their country. They used evaluations to achieve this goal. The idea
was that people in the universities would follow the guidance of external inspectors,
in the form of state ofﬁcials, foreign evaluators or colleagues from other univer-
sities. But do professors change because inspectors tell them to? In the Romanian
case, this is clearly not the case. Nearly everyone in the system is constantly
engaged in one form of evaluation or another. And once one round of evaluation
has ﬁnished, a new one begins immediately. Instead of having the time to change,
the academic community is stuck on a ‘merry-go-round’ of evaluations.
Many people in Romanian universities ﬁnd it difﬁcult to imagine that the
evaluation system will be reformed. Some may even be sceptical of any new change
of the legislative environment. But perhaps it is important to remember that eval-
uations are still a relatively new instrument in Romanian higher education. The
quality assurance agency ARACIS was created in 2006, while the classiﬁcation,
rankings and other evaluations were introduced only in 2011. Put differently, these
instruments are not old enough to have become institutionalized, but they exist for
long enough to be judged on their effectiveness. And we can be optimistic: many
national level policy-makers indicate that they are willing to change the system, and
recognize the problems mentioned in this paper.
The recommendations in this chapter are based on the views of people who are
stuck on this merry-go-round. The advantage of this type of analysis is that we are
fairly certain that the people who are supposed to implement these
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recommendations already support them. The interviewees recognize that no single
set of recommendations could solve all problems in Romanian higher education;
there is no ‘silver bullet’. Thus, we tried to break the problem down into smaller
sub-problems that can be productively addressed by policy. We also gave recom-
mendations to different actors: recommendations at national level imply the alter-
ation of the legal framework and national evaluation instruments; those for
universities imply changes at the management and departmental levels. The latter
changes can be made immediately, without lengthy parliamentary debates.
Our recommendations may be perceived as going in the direction of a com-
pletely decentralised evaluation system. While we think that more responsibility
should be placed in the hands of faculty, we do not discount the importance of
either national legislation, or leadership of the universities. The key here is dosage.
Medicine should not be so strong that it kills the patient. Nor should it be so diluted
that it doesn’t work at all. Careful recalibration could achieve a lot.
Our main message is that policy-makers should shift focus from the current
obsession about process to achieving substantive results in learning and scientiﬁc
research. They should envisage a bigger role for faculty and students inside the
university, and a smaller role for themselves, for external inspectors and university
management. While accountability will continue to be important, it should be based
on demonstrated achievement, rather than on process. Put otherwise, Romanian
policymakers should try to mobilise the brainpower of faculty and students in the
universities. Inspectors and inspected should step off the merry-go-round of eval-
uations and start reflecting on the purpose and scope of existent practices. Only then
can we engage in more meaningful evaluations.
Open Access This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
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